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Abstract—The note considers the problem of computing pure
Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies in distributed (i.e., network-
based) settings. The paper studies a class of inertial best response
dynamics based on the fictitious play (FP) algorithm. It is shown
that inertial best response dynamics are robust to informational
limitations common in distributed settings. Fully distributed
variants of FP with inertia and joint strategy FP with inertia
are developed and convergence is proven to the set of pure NE.
The distributed algorithms rely on consensus methods. Results
are validated using numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this note we are concerned with the problem of dis-
tributed computation of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (NE) in
finite games. More precisely, we are interested in a scenario
in which a group of agents, capable of communicating over
a sparse communication network, would like to cooperatively
compute a Nash equilibrium of some associated game.
As an example, consider the problem of distributed UAV
target assignment [1]. Suppose a group of UAVs is tasked with
covering a set of targets—each target should be covered by (or
assigned to) at least one UAV. The UAVs are capable of com-
municating with neighboring UAVs using a short range radio.
It is desired that, using the ad-hoc communication network,
the UAVs negotiate on an acceptable target assignment which
they can then physically implement. The target assignment
problem can be modeled as a game, the equilibria of which
are acceptable target assignments. The problem thus reduces
to one of distributed computation of Nash equilibria prior to
physically engaging in some game.1
A popular method for computing NE in games is the use of
so-called game-theoretic learning algorithms, in which players
repeatedly play some game, adapting their strategy in each
round according to some predefined behavior rules [2], [3].
A particularly simple and useful class of algorithms are those
based on best-response adaptation. In such algorithms, players
track some statistic of the game (e.g., the empirical distribution
of play, or some other useful aggregate statistic) and use this
information to forecast how other players will behave in the
future. Players choose next-stage actions as a best-response
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1The work [1] considers a similar target assignment problem, but does
not consider distributed (i.e., network-based) algorithms for addressing these
problems.
given their forecast. A Nash equilibrium is, by definition,
the fixed point of the best response correspondence and best-
response based dynamics play a fundamental role in the field
game-theoretic learning [2], [3]. The class of algorithms based
on best-response adaptation is broad, including simple round
robin best-response dynamics [4], fictitious play (FP) [5], and
inertial best response dynamics such as FP and joint strategy
fictitious play (JSFP) with inertia [6].
In general (when players are provided with full information
about the history of game play) such dynamics are guaranteed
to converge to the set of NE in many games of interest, includ-
ing the class of weakly acyclic games [3]. While the set of NE
includes both mixed (probabilistic) and pure (deterministic)
equilibria, in many applications of interest, pure equilibria are
preferable to mixed (e.g., in the target assignment problem
considered earlier). The incorporation of an inertial component
in best response dynamics is a common technique used to
ensure convergence to pure-strategy equilibria. Such dynamics
are popular in practice, with a prominent example being joint
strategy fictitious play (JSFP) with inertia [6].
The main contribution of this note is the development of
algorithms for computing pure-strategy NE in a distributed
setting. In particular, we develop techniques for implement-
ing inertial best-response algorithms in a distributed setting.
Our main contributions are the following: (1) We show that
inertial best response dynamics are robust to certain types of
informational limitations common in distributed settings, (2)
We develop a distributed variant of FP with inertia and prove
convergence to pure NE in the class of weakly acyclic games;
and (3) We develop a distributed implementation of JSFP
with inertia and show convergence to pure NE in congestion
games. While congestion games constitute a narrower class of
games than weakly acyclic games, the informational overhead
associated with JSFP is significantly less than that of FP.
We briefly review recent related literature on distributed
game-theoretic learning algorithms. The work [7] studies a
network-based variant of FP for computing NE, [8] studies
a gossip-based algorithm for computing NE in aggregative
games, [9] studies an algorithm for finding NE in a spatial
spectrum access games, [10] studies a network-based algo-
rithm for NE seeking in a two-network zero-sum games, [11]
presents a method for designing games with a prescribed
local dependence, [12] studies a distributed regret-based re-
inforcement learning algorithm for tracking the polytope of
correlated equilibria in time-varying games, and [13] studies a
gossip-based algorithm for computing NE in a network-based
setting in games with continuous-action spaces. To the best
of our knowledge, the present work is the first to consider
the problem of distributed computation of pure strategy NE in
finite games.
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2The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II sets up notation, Section III presents inertial best response
dynamics and proves a basic robustness result, Section IV
presents distributed FP with inertia, Section V presents dis-
tributed JSFP with inertia, Section VI gives a simulation
example, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A game in normal form is represented by the tuple Γ :=
(N , (Ai, ui)i∈N ), where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of
players, Ai denotes the finite set of actions available to player
i, and ui :
∏
i∈N Ai → R denotes the utility function of player
i. Denote by A := ∏i∈N Ai the joint action space.
We suppose players are permitted to use probabilistic strate-
gies. Formally, let the mixed strategy space of player i be
given by the set 4(Ai) of probability distributions over Ai,
and let 4n(A) := ∏ni=14(Ai) denote the set of joint mixed
strategies where it is assumed that players use independent
strategies. We represent a joint mixed strategy σ ∈ 4n(A) as
the n-tuple σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), where σi ∈ 4(Ai) denotes the
marginal mixed strategy of player i. When a mixed strategy
σ ∈ 4n(A) is played, we are interested in the expected payoff
which, in a slight abuse of notation, we write as
ui(σ) :=
∑
a∈A
ui(a)σ1(a1) . . . σn(an)
The notation ui(σi, σ−i) is meant to emphasize that the
payoff depends on the strategy σi chosen by player i and
the strategies σ−i := (σj)j∈N\{i} that are chosen by other
players.
Given a strategy σ−i ∈
∏
j∈N\{i}4(Ai), the best
response set of player i is given by BRi(σ−i) :=
arg maxσi∈4(Ai) ui(σi, σ−i). A mixed strategy σ ∈ 4n(A) is
said to be a Nash equilibrium if σi ∈ BR(σ−i) for all i ∈ N .
An equilibrium σ is said to be a pure Nash equilibrium if there
exists an action tuple a such that σ places weight 1 on a.
The learning algorithms considered in this paper assume the
following format of repeated play. Let a normal form game Γ
be fixed. Let players repeatedly face off in the game Γ, and for
t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, let ai,t ∈ Ai denote the action played by player
i in round t. Let the n-tuple at = (a1,t, . . . , an,t) denote the
joint action at time t.
In this note we will be interested in algorithms for com-
puting NE in a distributed information setup. We will say an
algorithm is distributed if it satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1 Players are equipped with a pre-assigned,
possibly sparse, communication graph G = (V, E), in which
a vertex represents a player, and an edge from vertex i to j
represents the ability of player i to communicate information
to player j. The directed graph G is strongly connected.
Players may exchange information with immediate neighbors
(the set of neighbors of a player i is given by Ni := {j ∈
N : (i, j) ∈ E}) once between iterations of the repeated play
process. Players know the structure of (only) their own utility
function, and may directly observe (only) their own actions.
We emphasize that players do not know the utility functions of
others, nor can they observe the actions of others, nor measure
their received payoffs (consider, for example, the distributed
target assignment problem in Section I). All additional infor-
mation must be disseminated over the communication graph.
We remark that in this paper we do not study communica-
tion as a strategic element. We are interested in cooperative
computation of NE in mutli-agent settings and we assume that
agents communicate as prescribed by the associated distributed
algorithm.
III. BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS
Suppose that players are engaged in repeated play of some
game Γ. For each i ∈ N , let σi,t ∈ 4(Ai) denote the strategy
used by player i in round t. Suppose that prior to round t, each
agent i forms an estimate σˆi−i,t ∈
∏
j∈N\{i}Aj of the mixed
strategy that will be used by other agents in the upcoming
round. The estimated strategy σˆi−i,t allows agent i to estimate
the payoff that it would receive from playing an arbitrary
action ai ∈ Ai. These estimated payoffs can be written as
uˆi,t(ai) := u(ai, σˆ
i
−i,t), ai ∈ Ai.
In a best response learning algorithm, in each stage of the
repeated play, each player plays an action that maximizes her
utility given her estimate of the strategies of others.
In this paper, we are interested in a slight modification in
which agents are sometimes “reluctant” to modify their action
choices from round to round. We refer to this general algorithm
(formally stated next) as inertial best response dynamics.2
Algorithm 2 Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) be an inertia constant and let ai,1
be an arbitrary initial action for each i. At time t > 1, agent
i has access to strategy estimates σˆij,t that it uses to compute
the best response set BR(σˆi−i,t). Players are said to follow
inertial best response dynamics if they play actions according
to
P (ai,t+1 = ai,t|Ft−1) = ρ, (1)
P (ai,t+1 ∈ BRi(σˆ−i,t)|Ft−1) = 1− ρ,
where (Ft)t≥1 is a filtration (sequence of increasing σ-
algebras) that contains the information available to players in
round t. As per (1), an inertial best response algorithm entails
player i sticking to its previous play ai,t with some (fixed)
probability ρ (this is the inertia component of the algorithm),
and playing a best response otherwise.
A. General Assumptions
Unless otherwise specified, throughout the paper we will
consider inertial best response dynamics in games satisfying
the following assumptions.
Assumption 3 The game Γ is weakly acyclic. That is, for any
a ∈ A, there exists a best-response path that converges to a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
A discussion of weakly acyclic games can be found in [3].
2We also refer to an algorithm of this form as an inertial best response
algorithm.
3Assumption 4 All pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game
Γ are strict.
We remark that Assumption 4 is generic in the sense that if the
number of players and actions are fixed, then the set of utility
functions for which Assumption 4 fails to hold is a closed
set of Lebesgue measure zero within the space of all possible
utility functions [14].
Assumption 5 Let {Ft}t≥1 be a filtration (sequence of in-
creasing σ-algebras) with Ft := σ({as}ts=1). The strategy
estimate σˆij,t ∈ 4(Aj) that agent i has of the strategy σj,t of
agent j is measurable with respect to Ft.
Assumption 5 means that the strategy estimates of agent i
are restricted to be a function of the history of play.
B. Inertial Best Response Dynamics: Convergence Under In-
formational Limitations
The following condition provides a basic sufficient condi-
tion, under which convergence to pure NE may still be ensured
in distributed settings when players’ ability to gather informa-
tion is restricted by some sparse interagent communication
graph.
Condition 6 There exist a positive integer T ∈ N+ such
that if any action a ∈ A is repeated consecutively for
T˜ ≥ T stages (i.e., as = a for s = t, . . . , t + T˜ − 1),
then arg maxαi∈Ai uˆi,t+T˜−1(αi) = arg maxαi∈Ai u(αi, a−i)
for all i ∈ N .
The condition above means that if players repeat an action
for a sufficient number of stages, then players are able to learn
to best respond to the actions played by others. In the context
of distributed algorithms, this relatively mild condition will
effectively ensure that information is tracked sufficiently well
so that the best response learning process can lock into a pure
NE strategy when one is played.
The following theorem establishes that inertial best response
dynamics converge under condition 6.
Theorem 7 Let {at}t≥1 be a sequence of actions generated
by inertial best response dynamics. Suppose Assumptions 3–
5 and Condition 6 hold. Then the action sequence {at}t≥1
converges to a pure-strategy NE of the game Γ, almost surely.
Moreover, let τ ∈ [1,∞] be a random variable indicating the
round number in which the action sequence at is absorbed to
a pure-strategy NE. Then E(τ) <∞.
We note that Theorem 7 may be seen as a robust version
of Young’s result for finite memory better reply processes (
[3], Theorem 6.2), that extends to infinite memory processes.
Better reply processes are a generalization of best reply
processes in which players choose actions with utility better
than the past average [3]. In order to simplify the presentation,
in this note we only consider the simpler case of best reply
dynamics.
We will prove Theorem 7 using a similar approach to
[3]. Lemma 8 shows that pure-strategy Nash equilibria are
absorbing, and Lemma 9 shows that the probability of reaching
such an absorbing state is uniformly bounded from below.
Together these prove Theorem 7.
Lemma 8 (absorption property) Let {at}t≥1 be a sequence
of actions generated by an inertial best response algorithm.
Suppose Assumptions 3–5 and Condition 6 hold. There exists
a T1 ∈ N+ such that if a∗ ∈ A is any pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium, and if a∗ is played in T1 consecutive stages, i.e.,
as = a
∗, for all s = t, . . . , t+T1− 1, then at+τ = a∗ for all
τ ≥ 0.
Proof: Let T be as in Condition 6, and let T1 ≥ T . Suppose
a∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium and as = a∗ for s = t, . . . , t+
T1 − 1. Then by Condition 6, argmaxa′i∈Ai uˆi,t+T˜ (a′i) =
argmaxa′i∈Ai ui(a
′
i, a
∗
−i), for all i. Moreover, by Assumption
4, the set argmaxa′i∈Ai ui(a
′
i, a
∗
−i) = {a∗i } is a singleton
for each i. Thus, the action a∗ is repeated in stage t + T1.
Inductively, we see that at+τ = a∗ for all τ ≥ 0. 
Lemma 9 (positive probability of absorption) Let {at}t≥1
be a sequence of actions generated by an inertial best response
algorithm. Suppose Assumptions 3–5 and Condition 6 hold.
Let T1 be as in Lemma 8, and let T2 ≥ T1 be given. Let t be
the current stage of the repeated play. Define the event
Et := {aτ = a∗ for some pure strategy NE a∗
for all τ ∈ {t′, t′ + 1, . . . , t′ + T2 − 1},
for some t′ ∈ {t, . . . , t+ T2|A|}}.
There exists an  = (T2) > 0 such that P(Et|Ft) >  for all
t ≥ 1.
Proof : The proof follows along the lines of the proof of
Theorem 3.1 in [6]. By Condition 6, for any t′ ≥ 1, if
any action a ∈ A is repeated consecutively from stage t′
to stage t′ + T2 − 1, then argmaxαi∈Ai uˆi,t′+T2−1(αi) =
argmaxαi∈Ai ui(αi, a−i). Let a
0 = at. Conditioned on Ft,
the action a0 will be played repeatedly in T2 consecu-
tive stages with probability at least 1 := ρn(T2−1) > 0.
Supposing this occurs, then at stage τ = t + T2 − 1,
argmaxαi∈Ai uˆi,τ (αi) = argmaxαi∈Ai ui(αi, a
0
−i). At this
point, either no players can improve their utility (in which case
we are at a pure NE), or at least one player can improve their
utility. If the latter is the case then, conditioned on Ft+T2−1,
with probability at least 2 := ρn−1(1−ρ), exactly one player
i chooses to take a best response and improves their utility,
and all others continue to play a0−i. Call the new action profile
a1. Continuing in this manner, we can construct a sequence
of actions a0, a1, . . . , am (terminating with at most m = |A|)
such that am is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Conditioned
on Ft, the probability of this action sequence occurring (and
then the final action am being played for T2 consecutive
stages) is bounded from below by  := (12)|A|ρT2−1. 
We now prove Theorem 7.
Proof : Let T2 be as in Lemma 9. By Lemma 8, if a pure
NE action a∗ is played in T2 consecutive stages, then a∗
will be played in all consecutive stages. By Lemma 9, the
4probability of reaching such an “absorbing state” is uniformly
lower bounded by some  > 0. Thus, the process is absorbed
to a pure NE almost surely in finite time, and E(τ) < ∞ (
[15], p.233). 
IV. DISTRIBUTED FICTITIOUS PLAY WITH INERTIA
In this section we will study a variant of the classical
FP algorithm in which the best response of classical FP is
augmented with an inertia term, and inter-agent communi-
cation is restricted to a graph. We begin by reviewing the
centralized FP with fading memory and inertia. We will
develop a distributed variant of this algorithm that operates
in network-based settings satisfying Assumption 1.
A. Fictitious Play with Inertia and Fading Memory
A review of the classical FP algorithm can be found in
[2], [3]. The FP with inertia algorithm is defined as follows.
Given an action ai ∈ Ai, let Ψ(a) ∈ 4(Ai) be the degenerate
probability distribution placing mass 1 on the action ai. Let
fi,t ∈ R|Ai| denote the weighted empirical distribution (or
just empirical distribution) of player i. Formally, fi,t may be
defined recursively by letting fi,1 = Ψ(ai,1) and for t ≥ 1
letting
fi,t+1 = (1− α)fi,t + αΨ(ai,t+1), (2)
where α ∈ (0, 1] is a step-size parameter.
Let the joint weighted empirical distribution profile (or joint
empirical distribution) be given by ft := (f1,t, . . . , fn,t).
The weighted empirical distribution is said to have “fading
memory” because it places greater weight on recent events.3
In fictitious play with fading memory and inertia, each
player chooses their next-stage action according to the rule
ai,t+1 ∈
{
argmaxαi∈Ai ui(αi, f−i,t) with prob. 1− ρ,
ai,t with prob. ρ,
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is some predefined “inertial constant” and the
probability is conditioned on Ft−1 (see Assumption 5). The
constant ρ ∈ (0, 1) adds a form of “inertia” by increasing the
probability that the current action will be repeated in upcoming
stages.
FP with inertia can be shown to converge to pure NE in
weakly acyclic games satisfying Assumption 4, which includes
almost all potential games. Examples of interest include any
multi-player engineered system with a global objective, e.g.,
power control in communication networks [16], [17], sensor
coverage [18], and wind energy harvesting [19].
In the distributed setting, players may lack sufficient infor-
mation to precisely compute the empirical distribution fi,t.
Let fˆ ij,t be an estimate that player i maintains of fj,t. Let
fˆ it = (fˆ
i
1,t, . . . , fˆ
i
n,t) be an estimate that player i maintains of
the empirical distribution profile ft.
3This is a consequence of the fact that α is a time-invariant constant. In
classical FP, the associated constant is permitted to be time-varying with αt =
1
t+1
, which results in fi,t being a histogram placing equal weight on the
events from all previous rounds. While the use of inertia is essential to the
structure of our proofs, the use of fading memory is less critical. It is possible
that the results still hold using a time-varying step size αt, (e.g., [6], Section
II-E); however, the assumption of fading memory simplifies the analysis.
B. Distributed FP Algorithm
For each j ∈ N , let Wj = (wij,k)i,k ∈ Rn×n be a
weight matrix to be used by player j ∈ N in the distributed
algorithm. The distributed FP with inertia algorithm is given
below. We assume that players are in a distributed setting
such that Assumption 1 holds. Thus, the only information
available to players is observations of their own actions, and
whatever information is transmitted to them by their neighbors
in previous rounds.
Algorithm 10
Initialize
(i) Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) be fixed. For each i, let the initial action ai,1
be chosen arbitrarily, let fi,1 = Ψ(ai,1), and let fˆ ii,1 = fi,1.
For j 6= i, let fˆ ij,1 = wij,jfj,1 if j ∈ Ni and fˆ ij,1 = 0
otherwise, where wij,j is a weight constant (see step (iv) and
Lemma 12 below).
Iterate (t ≥ 1)
(ii) Each agent i chooses their next-stage action according the
rule
ai,t+1 =
{
argmaxαi∈Ai ui(αi, fˆ
i
−i,t) with prob. 1− ρ,
ai,t with prob. ρ.
(iii) Each player i updates their personal empirical distribution
fi,t according to (2).
(iv) For each i, fˆ ij,t is updated as
fˆ ij,t+1 =
∑
k∈Ni
wij,k
(
fˆkj,t + (fj,t+1 − fj,t)χ{k=j}
)
, (3)
where χ{k=j} is the characteristic function defined by
χ{k=j} = 1 if k = j and χ{k=j} = 0 otherwise, and where
wij,k is the weight that player i attributes to k’s estimate of
j’s empirical frequency (see Lemma 12.)
C. Distributed FP with Inertia: Convergence Analysis
The following result establishes the convergence of Algo-
rithm 10.
Theorem 11 Suppose Assumptions 1, and 3–5 hold. Let Wj ∈
Rn×n, j ∈ N be a weight matrix with the i, k-th entry
given by Wj(i, k) = wij,k. Assume that the matrix Wj is
row stochastic with sparsity conforming to the communication
network G. Assume the j-th diagonal entry satisfies wjj,j = 1
for each j ∈ N . Let Pj be the matrix obtained by removing
the j-th row and column from Wj . Assume Pj is irreducible
and substochastic in the sense that at least one row sum of Pj
is strictly less than 1. Then Algorithm 10 converges to a pure
NE, almost surely.
We remark that conditions on the weight matrix Wj above
are closely related to those found in the literature on higher-
dimensional consensus [20].
Note that Algorithm 10 is an inertial best response process,
hence it converges to pure NE a.s. if Condition 6 holds. By
5Lipschitz continuity of ui, if ‖fi,t− f ji,t‖ → 0 for all i, j then
|ui(αi, f−i,t)−ui(αi, fˆ i−i,t)| → 0. Thus, the following Lemma
shows that under the hypotheses of Theorem 11, Condition 6
is satisfied. Theorem 11 then follows from Theorem 7 and
Lemma 12.
Lemma 12 Assume the hypotheses of Theorem 11 hold. Sup-
pose {at}t≥1 is generated according to Algorithm 10. Then,
for any  > 0 there exists T ∈ N+ such that if players
repeat any action a∗ ∈ A for T˜ ≥ T consecutive stages (i.e.,
as = a
∗, s = t, . . . , t+ T˜ − 1) then ‖fˆ i
t+T˜−1− ft+T˜−1‖ < .
The proof of Lemma 12 is given in the appendix.
Remark 13 We note that the techniques used to prove con-
vergence of Algorithm 10 to pure NE are flexible and are
not restricted to the information dissemination scheme used
in step (iv) of the algorithm. In particular, any information
dissemination scheme can be used in step (iv) so long as a
corresponding result analogous to Lemma 12 holds.
V. DISTRIBUTED JSFP WITH INERTIA
FP can be difficult to implement in practice due to the
high computational and memory requirements. Joint Strategy
FP (JSFP) with inertia, introduced in [6], is a variant of
FP developed for large-scale games that has relatively low
computational complexity and low information overhead re-
quirements. In this section we study a distributed variant of
JSFP with inertia (referred to hereafter as distributed JSFP)
for use in networked settings satisfying Assumption 1.4
The variant of JSFP that we study is applicable within the
class of congestion games—a subset of the more general class
of weakly-acyclic games (see Assumption 3). This restriction
comes as a consequence of the manner in which information
is aggregated over the communication network. Thus, while
distributed JSFP operates with lower complexity and commu-
nication overhead than distributed FP (Section IV), distributed
JSFP is applicable within a narrower class of games than
distributed FP.
The class of congestion games is introduced in Section V-A,
the distributed JSFP algorithm is presented in Sections V-B–
V-C, and convergence of the algorithm is analyzed in Section
V-D.
A. Congestion Games
Let R = {1, . . . ,m} denote a set of resources. For each
i ∈ N , let Ai ⊆ 2R, where 2R denotes the power set of R. In
particular, an action choice ai indicates a subset of resources
being utilized by player i.
In a congestion game, the cost associated with using a
resource is dependent on the total number of players using
4A related variant of JSFP—termed Average Strategy FP (ASFP)—is
studied in [21]. However, ASFP differs fundamentally from distributed JSFP
in that (i) ASFP assumes instantaneous and perfect information dissemination
by an oracle, and (ii) distributed JSFP uses a projection operation to make
sense of the notion of players “assuming” that the average congestion profile
represents choices taken by agents.
the same resource. For each r ∈ R, a ∈ A, let Nr(a) ∈ N
denote the number of players using resource r under the action
profile a. More generally, for a subset of players K ⊆ N , the
number of players in K utilizing resource r given (aj)j∈K, is
given by
Nr((aj)j∈K) :=
∑
j∈K
1(r ∈ aj).
where 1(r ∈ aj) = 1 if r ∈ aj and 1(r ∈ aj) = 0 otherwise.
Given a subset of players K, and a corresponding set of
actions (aj)j∈K, we represent the number of players using
each resource by N((aj)j∈K), where N :
∏
j∈KAj → Nm
is a mapping with the r-th entry in N((aj)j∈K) given by
Nr((aj)j∈K).
For r ∈ R and k ∈ N, let cr(k) be the cost associated with
using resource r, when there are precisely k players simulta-
neously using the resource. For ai ∈ Ai and Nr(a−i) ∈ N,
let the utility of player i be given by
ui(ai, a−i) = −
∑
r∈ai
cr(Nr(a))
= −
∑
r∈ai
cr(Nr(a−i) +Nr(ai))
where we have written Nr(a) = Nr(a−i) +Nr(ai) explicitly
to emphasize dependence of the utility on “self action” ai
and actions of other players a−i. Note that within the class
of congestion games, players do not need to precisely know
the full action profile a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A to compute their
utility. It is sufficient for each player to have knowledge of
N(a−i) ∈ Nm and their own action ai ∈ Ai. In this context,
we sometimes express the utility function using the abuse of
notation ui(ai, N(a−i)) = ui(ai, a−i).
In the following, we use this property of the utility functions
in congestion games to design the distributed JSFP algorithm
which has a lower communication overhead than distributed
FP.
B. Distributed JSFP Setup
Assume players repeatedly face off in a congestion game.
We define ζi,t(r) to be a (fading-memory) weighted average
used to track the amount of congestion induced on resource r
by the actions of (only) player i. In particular, let ζi,t(r) be
defined recursively by ζi,1(r) := Nr(ai,1), and for t ≥ 1,
ζi,t+1(r) := (1− α)ζi,t(r) + αNr(ai,t), (4)
where α ∈ (0, 1] is a weight parameter inducing a fading-
memory effect (cf. (2) and subsequent discussion).
Furthermore, define ζi,t ∈ Rm to be the vector stacking
(ζi,t(r))r∈R—this is a vectorized representation of the con-
gestion induced by player i on any given resource.
Define ζt(r) :=
∑
j∈N ζj,t(r)—this represents the conges-
tion induced on resource r by the actions of all players. Note
this can also be expressed recursively as ζt(r) = (1−α)ζt(r)+
αNr(a(t)).
Similar to the above, let ζt be a vector in Rm stacking
(ζt(r))r∈R—this is a vectorized representation of the conges-
tion induced by all players on any given resource. We refer
to ζt as the empirical congestion distribution.
6In the distributed framework, players may not have precise
knowledge of ζt. Instead, we assume each player i maintains
an estimate of ζt which we denote by ζˆit ∈ Rm. The r-th
term of player i’s estimate, ζˆit(r), represents her estimate of
the congestion at resource r ∈ R.
Finally, in order to rigorously define distributed JSFP, we
require the following notion of a projection. For a vector v ∈
Rm define P (v) to be a projection of v onto the set of non-
negative m-dimensional integer-valued vectors Nm; formally,
for 1 ≤ r ≤ m, let P (v, r) := z for the unique z ∈ N
satisfying z − 12 ≤ v(r) < z + 12 . Let P (v) be the vector
stacking {P (v, r)}r∈R.
C. Distributed JSFP Algorithm
Let W ∈ Rn×n be a weight matrix to be used in the
distributed algorithm with the i, kth entry given by wik. We
assume that players are in a distributed setting such that
Assumption 1 holds. The distributed JSFP algorithm is given
as follows.
Algorithm 14
initialize
(i) Let ai,1 be arbitrary for all i. Let ζˆi1 = N(ai,1) for all i.
iterate (t ≥ 1)
(ii) Let ζˆi−i,t = ζˆ
i
t − ζi,t. For each player i, the next-stage
action is chosen according to the rule
ai,t+1 ∈
{
argmaxαi∈Ai ui(αi, P (ζˆ
i
−i,t)), w.p. 1− ρ
ai,t, w.p. ρ.
(iii) Update ζi,t+1 according to (4).
(iv) Each player i updates their estimate of ζt as:
ζˆit+1 :=
∑
k∈Ni
wik
(
ζˆkt + ζk,t+1 − ζk,t
)
where wik denotes the weight that player i places on the
information received from player k (see Lemma 16).
We remark that in distributed JSFP players only share a
vector with m integer values with their neighbors where m is
the cardinality of the set of resources R. In comparison, the
distributed FP algorithm high higher memory and communica-
tion overhead requirements in that players share their estimate
of each agent’s empirical frequency implying that they share
n×m values at each step. Furthermore, in classical JSFP [6]
it is assumed that information is provided to players by an
oracle, whereas in the distributed variant above, the algorithm
explicitly handles information dissemination.
D. Distributed JSFP: Convergence Analysis
The following theorem gives the convergence result for
distributed JSFP with inertia.
Theorem 15 Assume Assumptions 1, 4–5 hold and that the
matrix W is doubly stochastic, aperiodic, and irreducible.
Then the distributed JSFP process converges to a pure-strategy
NE, almost surely.
In order to prove Theorem 15, we begin by showing the
following lemma.
Lemma 16 Let {at}t≥1 and {ζˆ1t , . . . , ζˆnt }t≥1 be generated
according to a distributed JSFP process, and let {ζt}t≥1 be
as defined in (4). Assume the hypotheses of Theorem 15 hold.
There exists a T˜ ≥ 1 such that if any action a∗ is repeated in
T˜ ≥ T consecutive stages then |ζˆi
t+T˜
(r) − Nr(a∗)| < 14 for
every r ∈ R.
The proof of Lemma 16 is similar to the proof of Lemma
12 (see appendix) and is omitted here for brevity.
Given Lemma 16, the following lemma shows that if any
action a∗ is repeated in sufficiently many stages, then each
player’s estimate ζˆi−i,t may be brought sufficiently close to
the congestion profile N(a∗−i) to ensure convergence of the
process.
Lemma 17 Let {at}t≥1 and {ζˆ1t , . . . , ζˆnt }t≥1 be generated
according to a distributed JSFP process and let {ζi,t}i∈N ,t≥1
be as defined in (4). Assume the hypotheses of Theorem 15
hold. There exists a T ≥ 1 such that if any action a∗ is
repeated in T˜ ≥ T consecutive stages then |ζˆi−i,t+T˜ (r) −
Nr(a
∗
−i)| < 12 for every r ∈ R.
Proof: Let T˜ ≥ 0 and note that
|ζˆi−i,t+T˜ (r)−Nr(a∗−i)|
= |(ζˆi
t+T˜
(r)− ζi,t+T˜ (r))− (Nr(a∗)−Nr(a∗i ))|
≤ |ζˆi
t+T˜
(r)−Nr(a∗)|+ |ζi,t+T˜ (r)−Nr(a∗i )|. (5)
By Lemma 16, we may choose T ′ such that if a∗ is repeated in
T˜ ≥ T ′ consecutive stages, there holds |ζˆi
t+T˜
(r)−Nr(a∗)| <
1
4 . Note also that |ζi,t+T˜ (r) −Nr(a∗i )| → 0 as T˜ → ∞ (this
follows from (4)), and thus we may choose T ′′ such that for
T˜ ≥ T ′′ there holds |ζi,t+T˜ (r) − Nr(a∗i )| < 14 . Letting T =
max{T ′, T ′′}, the desired result follows from (5). 
The next lemma sets us up to prove convergence of dis-
tributed JSFP using Theorem 7 and Condition 6.
Lemma 18 Let {at}t≥1 and {ζˆ1t , . . . , ζˆnt }t≥1 be gener-
ated according to a distributed JSFP process, and let
{ζi,t}i∈N ,t≥1 be as defined in (4). Assume the hypothe-
ses of Theorem 15 hold. There exists a T ≥ 1 such
that if any action a∗ is repeated in T˜ ≥ T con-
secutive stages then argmaxαi∈Ai ui(αi, P (ζˆ
i
−i,t+T˜ )) =
argmaxαi∈Ai ui(αi, N(a
∗
−i)).
Proof : Let T be chosen as in Lemma 17 so that
|ζˆi−i,t+T˜ (r) − Nr(a∗−i)| < 12 for every r ∈ R,
i ∈ N and all T˜ ≥ T ′. It follows that P (ζˆi−i,t+T˜ ) =
N(a∗−i). Thus, argmaxαi∈Ai ui(αi, P (ζˆ
i
−i,t+T˜ )) =
argmaxαi∈Ai ui(αi, N(a
∗
−i)). 
Finally, we note that Algorithm 14 is an inertial best
response process, fitting the template of Theorem 7, with
ui(αi, P (ζˆ
i
−i,t)) = uˆi,t(αi) for each i and each αi ∈ Ai.
7By Lemma 18, the sequence {ui(αi, P (ζi−i,t))}t≥1 satisfies
Condition 6. Theorem 15 then follows from Theorem 7.
Remark 19 We note that the techniques used to prove con-
vergence of Algorithm 14 to pure NE are flexible and are
not restricted to the information dissemination scheme used
in step (iv) of the algorithm. In particular, any information
dissemination scheme can be used in step (iv) so long as a
corresponding result analogous to Lemma 12 holds. We also
note that while we do not consider time-varying communica-
tion networks in this note, our results can be extended to such
settings so long as the estimate updates satisfy Condition 6.
VI. DISTRIBUTED UAV TARGET ASSIGNMENT
We consider the effect of ommunication network G on
convergence time in the example of UAV target assignment
problem. We consider n UAVs, and n target objects. Each UAV
can target one object and goal is to target all of the objects as
a team. The action space is the set of objects {1, 2 . . . , n}
for each UAV. The payoff of UAV i targeting object k is
inversely proportional to its distance to the object, represented
by d(i, k), if no other UAV is targeting object k,
ui(ai = k, a−i, d(i, k)) = d(i, k)−11(
n∑
j=1
1(aj = k) = 1)
where 1(·) is the indicator function. The target assignment
game with payoffs as above is a congestion game with each
object representing a resource. Note that any action profile
that covers all the objects is a Nash equilibrium because any
unilateral deviation from such profile results in zero payoff
for the deviating agent. The optimal Nash equilibrium profile
minimizes the total distance while covering all the objects.
In the numerical setup, we consider n = 5 UAVs and
n = 5 objects with α = 0.2 and δ = 0.2. For comparison,
we consider the centralized JSFP (complete network), and D-
JSFP in line, ring and star communication networks. For each
setting, we consider 50 runs. In Figure 1, we plot sample
average welfare normalized by the optimal welfare over time
for each network type. Welfare at time t is defined as the sum
of utilities of UAVs given the action profile generated by the
D-JSFP process at time t. The expected welfare at time t is
the average of welfare values at time t obtained over 50 runs.
Optimal welfare is the value of welfare obtained by the action
profile that maximizes the sum of the utilities. Fig. 1 shows
that the expected welfare of the Nash equilibrium reached
by the algorithm is similar regardless of the communication
network. However, the convergence time of the algorithm
depends on the network structure where the star network has
the slowest convergence time and the ring network has the
fastest convergence time comparable to the centralized JSFP.
We further analyze the effect of the inertia and fading con-
stants on convergence time where we assume α ∈ (0.1, 0.9)
and ρ ∈ (0.1, 0.9). We consider increments of 0.1 for each
constant and simulate 50 runs for a given pair of α and ρ
values. Convergence time is relatively worse when α is high
(greater than 0.7) and ρ is small (less than 0.3). This worst case
is when agents are sensitive to current events and often best
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Fig. 1. Expected welfare normalized by optimal welfare for complete, line,
star and ring networks. The expected welfare is similar for all communication
networks. Convergence time to a Nash equilibrium is the fastest for the
complete network and slowest for the star network.
Inertia ρ
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Central 22 22 25 38
Line 146 148 162 104
Star 404 430 364 245
Ring 30 33 34 37
TABLE I
D-JSFP ALGORITHM: AVERAGE CONVERGENCE TIME
respond. In other values of the constants, the convergence time
to pure Nash equilibria are comparable for a given network
structure. In general when fading constant is small (α ≤ 0.3),
a broad range of the inertia constant ρ ∈ (0.1, 0.8) achieves
relatively fast convergence. We show the average number of
steps for convergence when α = 0.2 with respect to different
ρ values in Table I.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have studied general inertial best response dynamics for
learning pure-strategy NE in distributed multi-agent systems.
Subsequently, we have studied two important cases of inertial
best response dynamics (FP and JSFP); we have derived
distributed variants of both algorithms and derived sufficient
conditions for convergence. Results were corroborated with a
simulation example of an n-UAV target assignment problem.
In future research, it may be interesting to investigate the
extension of these techniques to develop distributed imple-
mentations of related algorithms such as no-regret algorithms,
e.g., [22].
APPENDIX
Consider a network of n nodes connected through a communi-
cation graph G = (V,E). The graph is assumed to be strongly
connected. For t = 1, 2, . . . let x1(t) ∈ R denote a value held by
node 1 at time t. The objective is for all nodes to track as closely as
possible the value x1(t).5 Let (t) := |x1(t+1)−x1(t)| and assume
that:
5In general, the objective may be to track the value xj(t) held by an
arbitrary node j. Here, we only consider tracking x1(t), however, the general
case is recovered by a permutation of the node labels.
8Assumption 20 There exists a B > 0 such that (t) < B for all
t ∈ N.
Let xˆi(t) be the estimate player i maintains of x1(t). We make
the following assumption pertaining to the initial error in players’
estimates:
Assumption 21 xˆi(0)− x1(0) = 0 for all i.
Let xˆ(t) = (xˆ1(t), . . . , xˆn(t)) ∈ Rn be a vector stacking all
players’ estimates, with xˆ1(t) = x1(t) (i.e., node j knows its own
value). Suppose the estimates are updated according to the following
recursion:
xˆ(t+ 1) =W (xˆ(t) + e1(x1(t+ 1)− x1(t))) , (6)
where e1 ∈ Rn is the 1-st canonical vector, and where the matrix
W ∈ Rn×n satisfies
Assumption 22 W is row stochastic with sparsity conforming to G.
Furthermore, W may be decomposed as
W =
(
1 0
b P
)
where b ∈ Rn−1, b 6= 0 and P is irreducible (cf. [20]).
Note that in since W is row stochastic, b 6= 0 if and only if P is
substochastic in the sense that at least one row sum of P is less than
1.
The following lemma gives a bound on the error in the agents’
estimates of x1(t).
Lemma 23 Suppose Assumptions 20–21 hold, and let the sequence
{xˆ(t)}∞t=1 be computed according to (6). Suppose there exists a t∗ ≥
1 and T ≥ 1 such that ∑t∗+T−2t=t∗ (t) ≤ 1 and {(t)}t∗+T−2t=t∗ is
decreasing. Then the error at time t∗ + T − 1 is bounded as,
‖xˆ(t∗ + T − 1)− x1(t∗ + T − 1)1‖ ≤ n+ 1
1− λ
(
1
T
+BλT
)
,
where λ := sup
‖y‖=1
‖Py‖ < 1.
Proof: Let y(t) := xˆ(t)−x1(t)1. Let δ(t) := [x1(t+1)−x1(t)]e1−
[x1(t+ 1)− x1(t)]1. Subtracting x1(t+ 1)1 from both sides of (6)
we get
y(t+ 1) =W (xˆ(t) + [x1(t+ 1)− x1(t)]e1)− x1(t+ 1)1
=W (xˆ(t) + [x1(t+ 1)− x1(t)]e1 − x1(t+ 1)1)
where, in the second line, we may bring x1(t + 1)1 inside the
matrix multiplication due to the row stochasticity of W . Now
we add and subtract x1(t) and use the definitions of y(t) and
δ(t) to get y(t + 1) = W (y(t) + δ(t)) . Inductively, this gives
y(t + 1) =
∑t
s=0W
s+1δ(t − s) +W t+1y(0). By Assumption 21
we have y(0) = 0, and hence y(t+ 1) =
∑t
s=0W
s+1δ(t− s). By
the triangle inequality we have
‖y(t+ 1)‖ ≤
t∑
s=0
‖W s+1δ(t− s)‖. (7)
Again using the triangle inequality, we establish a bound on
‖δ(t)‖:
‖δ(t)‖ ≤ ‖[x1(t+ 1)− x1(t)]e1‖+ ‖[x1(t+ 1)− x1(t)]1‖
≤ (t) + n(t) = (n+ 1)(t). (8)
Let W := W − 1eT1 . In block form we have W = [0 . . . 0; (b −
1) P ]. Due to the special block form of W , the spectrum σ(W )6
6In Section II the symbol σ was used to represent a mixed strategy. In
keeping with standard conventions, we use σ here to denote the spectrum of
a matrix, where the distinction is clear from the context.
of W consists precisely of {σ(P )∪{0}}. Hence, the spectral radius
of W coincides with that of P . In particular, the spectral radius of
W is given by λ. Since P is substochastic, we have λ < 1.
Substituting W = W + 1eT1 in (7) gives ‖y(t + 1)‖ ≤∑t
s=1 ‖(W +1eT1 )s+1δ(t−s)‖. Since W1 = 0, and eT1W = 0, and
1eT1 = (1e
T
1 )
s for any s = 1, 2, . . ., an inductive argument shows
that W s = W
s
+ 1eT1 for any s = 1, 2, . . .. Thus we can upper
bound ‖y(t+ 1)‖ using the triangle inequality as follows
‖y(t+ 1)‖ ≤
t∑
s=0
(
‖W s+1δ(t− s)‖+ ‖(1eT1 )s+1δ(t− s)‖
)
It is readily verified that for s = 1, 2, . . . there holds eT1 δ(s) = 0.
Thus, the second term on the right hand side above is zero, i.e.,
‖y(t+ 1)‖ ≤∑ts=0 ‖W s+1δ(t− s)‖. As a result we have, ‖y(t+
1)‖ ≤∑ts=0 λs+1‖δ(t− s)‖.
Let t = t∗ + T − 1. Using the bound in (8) gives,
‖y(t)‖ ≤
t−1∑
s=0
λs+1(n+ 1)(t− 1− s) (9)
= (n+ 1)
t−t∗−1∑
s=0
λs+1(t− 1− s) + (n+ 1)
t−1∑
s=t−t∗
λs+1(t− 1− s).
Consider the first term on the right hand side (RHS) above.
Let avg(t∗, T ) := 1T
∑t∗+T−2
s=t∗ (s). By assumption, the sequence
{(t)}t∗+T−2t=t∗ is decreasing, hence by Chebychev’s sum inequality
[23] (p. 43-44),
t−t∗−1∑
s=0
λs+1(t−1−s) ≤ avg(t∗, T )
t−t∗−1∑
s=0
λs+1 ≤
avg(t
∗, T ) 1
1−λ , where the latter inequality follows by taking the
closed form of the geometric sum. Furthermore, by assumption we
have
∑t∗+T−2
s=t∗ (s) ≤ 1, and hence avg(t∗, T ) ≤ 1T , which gives
that
t−t∗−1∑
s=0
λs+1(t− s) ≤ 1
T
1
1−λ .
Now consider the second term on the RHS of (9). By Assumption
20, we have (t − s) ≤ B which allows us to bound the second
term as (n + 1)
t−1∑
s=t−t∗
λs+1(t − 1 − s) ≤ (n + 1)B
t−1∑
s=t−t∗
λs+1 =
(n + 1)BλT
t∗−1∑
s=0
λs ≤ (n + 1)BλT (1 − λ)−1, where the latter
inequality again follows by taking the closed form of the geometric
sum.
Substituting these two bounds back into (9) we get
‖y(t)‖ ≤ (n+ 1) 1
T
1
1− λ + (n+ 1)Bλ
T 1
1− λ
= (n+ 1)
1
1− λ
(
1
T
+BλT
)
.
Since we chose t = t∗ + T − 1, this concludes the proof. 
In order to apply Lemma 23, one must show that
∑t∗+T−2
t=t∗ (t) <
1. Essentially, this condition states that the variation in the node value
x1(t) during the designated time interval remains bounded. This can
be easily ensured, for example, if the value of x1(t) is monotone.
This is the content of the following Lemma.
Lemma 24 Suppose that x1(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t. Suppose also there
exist t∗, T ∈ N+ such that {x1(t)}t∗+T−1t=t∗ is a monotone sequence.
Then
∑t∗+T−2
t=t∗ (t) ≤ 1.
Proof: Suppose that {x1(t)}t∗+T−1t=t∗ is monotone increasing. Then
(t) = |x1(t + 1) − x1(t)| = x1(t + 1) − x1(t). Substituting this
into the sum in question gives a telescoping sum
∑t∗+T−2
t=t∗ (t) =∑t∗+T−2
t=t∗ x1(t+1)−x1(t) = x1(t∗+T−1)−x1(t∗) ≤ 1. The final
inequality follows since 0 ≤ x1(t) ≤ 1 for all t. A similar argument
handles the monotone decreasing case. 
9We now prove Lemma 12 of Section IV-C. Proof (Lemma 12):
Let  > 0 and let t∗ ∈ N+ be arbitrary. Our task is to show that
under the update rule (3), there exists a T such that if starting at
time t∗ any action is repeated in T˜ ≥ T consecutive stages, then
‖fˆ i
t∗+T˜−1 − ft∗+T˜−1‖ < . We will accomplish this by showing
that the update rule (3) fits the template of Lemma 23.
Fix a player j ∈ N and action aj ∈ Aj . Let fj,t(aj) de-
note the weight that the empirical distribution fj,t places on aj ,
and similarly, let fˆ ij,t(aj) denote the weight that fˆ
i
j,t places on
aj . For the purpose of applying Lemma 23, let xj(0) = 0, let
xj(t) := fj,t(aj), t ≥ 1 and for i = 1, . . . , n let xˆi(0) = 0,
and let xˆi(t) := fˆ ij,t(aj) for t ≥ 1. Note that Assumption 21
is satisfied since xˆi(0) = 0 = xj(0) for all i. By (3) and
the initialization condition for Algorithm 10 for t ≥ 0 we have
xˆi(t + 1) =
∑
k∈Ni w
i
j,k
(
xˆk(t) + (xj(t+ 1)− xj(t))χ{k=j}
)
.
Letting xˆ(t) = (xˆi(t))ni=1 ∈ Rn we may express the update rule
in more compact notation as
xˆ(t+ 1) =Wj (xˆ(t) + ej(xj(t+ 1)− xj(t))) ,
where Wj = (wij,k)i,k∈N is the weight matrix as assumed in
Lemma 12 and ej is the j-th canonnical vector in R|Aj |. Note that,
after a permutation of the player ordering (which causes no loss in
generality), this fits the format of (6). Note also that Assumption 20
is satisfied since xj(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t. Furthermore, Assumption 21
is satisfied since, by construction, xˆi(0) = xj(0) = 0 for all i, and
Assumption 22 is satisfied by the hypothesis of Lemma 12.
Now, let (t) := |xj(t + 1) − xj(t)| and suppose that starting
at time t∗ some action a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) ∈ A is repeated in T
consecutive stages, where T ∈ N+ is arbitrary. Two cases must be
considered—the case that aj = a∗j (i.e., the action which defines
xj is in fact the action being repeated by player j), and the case
that aj 6= a∗j (i.e., the action which defines xj is not being played
at all by j during the designated time sequence.) If aj = a∗j
then {xj(t)}t∗+T−1t=t∗ = {fj,t(aj)}t
∗+T−1
t=t∗ increases monotonically
towards 1 (this follows from (2)). Otherwise, if aj 6= a∗j then
{xj(t)}t∗+T−1t=t∗ = {fj,t(aj)}t
∗+T−1
t=t∗ decreases monotonically to-
wards 0. Since, in either case the sequence is monotone, we have
by Lemma 24 that
∑t∗+T−2
t=t∗+1 (t) ≤ 1.
Note also that if some action a∗ is repeated from time t∗ to t∗ +
T − 1, then the difference sequence {(t)}t∗+T−2t=t∗ = {|fj,t+1(aj)−
fj,t(aj)|}t∗+T−2t=t∗ is decreasing. This follows from (2).
We are now in a position to apply Lemma 23. By the equivalence
of finite dimensional norms, there exist constants c1 and c∞ such that
‖ · ‖ ≤ c1‖ · ‖1 and c∞‖ · ‖∞ ≤ ‖ · ‖. Given j ∈ N and some action
aj ∈ Aj we may choose a constant Taj ∈ N+ sufficiently large such
that n+1
1−λ
(
1
Taj
+Bλ
Taj
)
< c∞ c1
∑n
i=1 |Ai|
. Applying Lemma 23
we get that if any action a∗ is repeated in T ≥ Taj consecutive
stages starting at any time t∗ then
max
i∈N
|f ij,t∗+T−1(aj)− fj,t∗+T−1(aj)| (10)
= ‖(f ij,t∗+T−1(aj))ni=1 − fj,t∗+T−1(aj)1‖∞
= ‖xˆ(t∗ + T − 1)− xj(t∗ + T − 1)1‖∞
<
1
c∞
‖xˆ(t∗ + T − 1)− xj(t∗ + T − 1)1‖ ≤ 
c1
∑n
i=1 |Ai|
.
Let T := maxj∈N ,aj∈Aj Taj . By (10) we have |f ij,t∗+T˜ (aj) −
fj,t∗+T˜ (aj)| < c1|∑ni=1 |Ai| for all T˜ ≥ T for all i, j ∈ N and
for all aj ∈ Aj .
Now, fix any player i ∈ N . Observe that for any T˜ ≥ T we
have ‖fˆ i
t∗+T˜−1 − ft∗+T˜−1‖ ≤ c1‖fˆ it∗+T˜−1 − ft∗+T˜−1‖1 =
c1
∑
j∈N
∑
aj∈Aj |fˆ
i
j,t∗+T˜−1(aj) − fj,t∗+T˜−1(aj)| ≤
c1(
∑n
j=1 |Aj |) c1∑nj=1 |Aj | = , which is the desired result.

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